JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATORY DOCUMENTS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION IN CHINA
Wang Jing†
Judicial review of rules or regulations by the government is
far from new, but in China it is a novelty. After the latest revision of
the Administrative Litigation Law of China (“ALL”) in 2014, courts
formally began to have authority to review regulatory documents in
administrative litigation.1 The National People’s Congress of China
(“NPC”) implemented a new system of reform through supervision
letters to provincial and city people’s congresses asking they correct
problems in local regulations (difangxing fagui). Relatedly, judicial
review of regulatory documents has become a component of legality
review and constitutional review in China. 2
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1
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (中华人民共和国行
政诉讼法) [Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1989,
effective Oct. 1, 1990), STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ.,
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006-10/29/content_1499268.htm
[https://perma.cc/RGF8-68E9] [hereinafter Original ALL]. The official
translation is Administrative Procedure Law, but in the academic field, it is also
often referred to as the Administrative Litigation Law.
2
CHENG SHUWEN (程姝雯) & WANG XIUZHONG (王秀中), Quanguo Renda
Changweihui Shouci dui Weifa Wenjian Fachu Jiuzheng Dubanhan, Hexianxing
Shencha yi Jianzaixianshang (全国人大常委会首次对违法文件发出纠正“督办
函” 合宪性审查已箭在弦上) [The Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress Issues Supervision Letters over Enforcement to Correct Illegal
Provisions and Constitutional Review is in the Offing], NANFANG DUSHI BAO (南
方都市报) [SOUTHERN METROPOLIS DAILY] (Mar. 1, 2018, 00:00 AM),
https://www.sohu.com/a/224542479_161795 [https://perma.cc/G78G-GSY9].
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The ALL can be taken as the starting point of “rule of law
government” (fazhi zhengfu) in China, giving ordinary people the
right to directly sue the government. Since then, the ALL has played
a unique and significant role in pushing forward the rule of law in
China, but it also has faced many challenges and criticisms since its
inception. 3 Over the past twenty years, scholars and experts from
time to time proposed revisions to the ALL. With the growth of
various conflicts in China, dispute resolution has received more
attention. The Revised ALL was supposed to be on the legislative
agenda of the NPC in 2006 but later was postponed due to, among
other reasons, disagreement on some important issues. 4 On
December 23, 2013, the draft of revision of ALL was first submitted
to NPC. 5 Finally, on November 1, 2014, the 11th Session of the 12th
National People’s Congress adopted the revision of ALL after three

3

See Neysun A. Mahboubi, Suing the Government in China, in
DEMOCRATIZATION IN CHINA, KOREA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: LOCAL AND
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 141, 141–155 (Kate Xiao Zhou et al. eds., 2014)
(discussing the changes and challenges brought by the ALL in China).
4
The issues in this revision include whether China should and could
establish an independent administrative court system or another substitute
mechanism to strengthen independence and fairness of administrative litigation,
whether the parties can mediate administrative disputes in administrative
litigation and how they do so, whether the court should expand the scope of
judicial review and to what extent, whether the court should accept and review
public interest lawsuits, how to review, how to improve the evidence rules, and
how to perfect the litigation categories and evidence rules. See Ying Songnian
(应松年) & Yang Weidong (杨伟东), Woguo Xingzheng Susong Xiuzheng Chubu
Shexiang Shang (我国《行政诉讼法》修正初步设想(上)) [Tentative Ideas on
Amending the Administrative Procedure Law of China I], 10 ZHONGGUO SIFA (中
国司法) [JUST. OF CHINA] 28 (2004).
5
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiuzheng'an Caoan
(中华人民共和国行政诉讼法修正案(草案)) [Amendment of the Administrative
Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Draft ALL].
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reads. 6 The Revised ALL went into effect on May 1, 2015.7 During
the revision process of the ALL and its enforcement, scholars,
officials, judges, and related professional people discussed many
important issues of the ALL.8 Among the controversial issues that
6

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (中华人民共和国行
政诉讼法) [Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014,
effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (China)
[hereinafter Revised ALL]. See Xin Chunying (信春鹰), Guanyu Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa Xiuzheng'an Caoan de Shuoming (关于
《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法修正案(草案)》的说明) [Interpretation on the
Draft of Administrative Litigation Law Amendment of People’s Republic of
China], ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC],
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2014-12/23/content_1892443.htm
[https://perma.cc/6QEZ-DMMT].
7
Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ.
8
Among these issues, the proposal to establish a separate and independent
administrative court system outside of the present standard court structure—
similar to maritime courts which were operating well at that time and railway
courts which were already abolished—was debated and discussed at the 2012
Annual Conference of China Society of Administrative Law. It was later
supported by many scholars, judges, and officials, but did not happen. At that
time, the NPC already adopted the former existing judicial reform methods as an
alternative plan to the independent administrative court system, including
elevating the jurisdiction of the administrative cases in which the government
above the county level is the defendant to the intermediate courts and authorizing
the higher courts to establish circuit tribunals in one provincial region. But now
in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, the new courts with cross administration
regions were established. They all mainly accept and try administrative litigation
cases, so they can be regarded as a kind of administrative court. Lin Hua (林华),
Zhongguo Xingzheng Faxue Yanjiuhui 2012 Nian Nianhui Zongshu (中国行政法
学研究会 2012 年年会综述) [Summary of Annual Conference of Chinese
Society of Administrative Law in 2012], 26 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU (行政法
学研究) [ADMIN. L. REV.] 138, 138–144 (2013); Ma Huaide(马怀德), Xingzheng
Shenpan Tizhi Gaige de Mubiao: Sheli Xingzheng Fayuan (行政审判体制改革的
目标: 设立行政法院) [To Establish Administrative Court is the Objective of
Reform of Administrative Trial System), 3 FALV SHIYONG(法律适用) [JOURNAL
OF LAW APPLICATION] 8, 8–11(2013); Qiao Wenxin (乔文心), Kua Xingzheng
Quhua Fayuan: Pochu Sifa Difanghua Fanli (跨行政区划法院:破除司法地方化
藩篱) [Cross-district Court: Break Barriers of Judicial Local Protectionism],
RENMIN FAYUAN BAo (人民法院报) [PEOPLE'S COURT DAILY] (Nov. 14, 2016).
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were being debated fiercely, expansion of judicial review was clearly
an eye-catching topic. As Professor Hu Jianmiao said, “the changes
in the scope of administrative litigation could serve as the barometer
of the advancement of the rule of law in China”.9 Professor Yang
Weidong also argued: “As to the case scope, the promulgation of the
ALL is just the start of questions rather than the end of questions. ”10
Proposals that “abstract administrative actions” as described below
can be reviewable in the administrative litigation were put forth long
ago. 11 There was wide agreement among scholars and other
commentators that abstract administrative actions should be included
in judicial review, but some insisted that not all abstract
administrative actions were appropriate for review in the litigation
process. 12 In different revision suggestions submitted by the
9

Hu Jianmiao (胡建淼), Zhongguo Xingzheng Susong Fanwei de Yanbian
yu Quxiang: Huading, Xianzhi, Huifu, Tuozhan (中国行政诉讼范围的演变与趋
向: 划定, 限制, 恢复, 拓展) [Changes and Trends of Scope of Administrative
Litigation in China: Designation, Limitation, Recovery and Expansion], 23
ZHENGFA LUNTAN (政法论坛) [TRIB. OF POL. SCI. & L.] 3, 3 (2005).
10
Yang Weidong (杨伟东), Xingzheng Susong Shouan Fanwei Fenxi (行政
诉讼受案范围分析) [Analysis on Case Scope of Administrative Litigation], 26
XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU (行政法学研究) [ADMIN. L. REV.] 84, 85 (2004).
11
See Shi Hongxin (石红心), Lun Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei de Sifa
Shencha (论抽象行政行为的司法审查) [On Judicial Review of Abstract
Administrative Actions], 26 YANJIUSHENG FAXUE (研究生法学) [GRADUATE L.
REV.] 28, 29–33 (1996) (discussing the rationales and the importance of judicial
review over abstract administrative actions). In 1997, several judges from the
basic courts discussed the necessity and the possibility of expanding judicial
review to abstract administrative actions. See Qian Cuihua et al. (钱翠华等),
Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei Nengfou Tiqi Susong de Tantao (抽象行政行为能
否提起诉讼的探讨) [Discussion about Whether Can Sue the Abstract
Administrative Actions], 16 ZHENGZHI YU FALV (政治与法律) [POL. SCI. & L.]
20, 20–25 (1997) (listing different judges’ views on if and how to conduct judicial
review on abstract administrative actions).
12
Zhan Zhongle (湛中乐), Zhongguo Xingzheng Susongfa Xiuzheng (中国
行政诉讼法修正) [The Amendment of the Administrative Procedure Law of
China], 7 ZHONGGUO FAXUE QIANYAN (中国法学前沿) [FRONTIERS L. CHINA]
211, 214 (2012); Xue Gangling (薛刚凌) & Li Chunyan (李春燕), Xingzheng
Susongfa Xiuding zhi Jiegou Moshi Yanjiu (行政诉讼法修订之结构模式研究)
[Study on the Structure and Models of Revision of Administrative Litigation
Law], 2 JIANGSU SHEHUI KEXUE (江苏社会科学) [JIANGSU SOC. SCI.] 116, 120
(2005). See Guo Shaofeng (郭少峰), Beida Xuezhe Tijiao Xingzheng Susongfa
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Supreme People’s Court, several universities, and the China Society
of Administrative Law, judicial review of regulatory documents was
mentioned.13 Although the Revised ALL already stipulates judicial
review of regulatory documents, the debates are still ongoing and
some controversies have not been settled. This article aims to review
the history of debates on this issue, introduce the controversies that
influenced the revision of the ALL, examine the relationship between
judicial review of regulatory documents and other similar channels,
analyze the essence and significance of new changes in the Revised
ALL concerning judicial review of regulatory documents, and discuss
several important issues in the implementation of new provisions of
judicial review of regulatory documents.

Xiugai Yijiangao (北大学者提交《行政诉讼法》修改意见稿) [Scholars from
Peking University Submitted Opinions on Revision of the Administrative
Litigation Law], XINJINGBAO (新京报) [THE BEIJING NEWS] (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2012/02/22/183964.html
[http://perma.cc/V7VR-RFS7] (reporting scholars submitted opinion on the
revision of administrative litigation law which touched upon the scope of judicial
review).
13
In China, there are four levels of courts including the Supreme People’s
Court, Provincial Higher People’s Courts, Intermediate People’s Courts, and
Basic People’s Courts. The Supreme People’s Court is the court of last resort.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (2006 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共
和国人民法院组织法 (2006 修正)) [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the
People’s Republic of China (2006 Revision)] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007), art. 2 & 12.
China University of Political Science and law, Peking University, Renmin
University, and Tsinghua University invited the scholars from all over the country
to make the suggestions for the revision of the ALL. The suggestions from
Peking University proposed that rules and regulatory documents should fall
within the review scope of administrative litigation incidentally with the specific
administrative documents, and if the regulatory documents infringe upon a
citizen’s rights and benefits, the citizen can bring the lawsuit directly. PEKING U.
RES. CTR. for CONST. L. and ADMIN. L. (北京大学宪法与行政法研究中心),
Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiugai Jianyigao Beidaban Zhengshi Fabu (《行政诉讼
法)修改建议稿北大版正式发布) [Official Publication of the Amendment to
Administrative Litigation Law proposed by Peking University scholars],
http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2012-02/22/content_319118.htm?div=-1
[https://perma.cc/8XJU-9RQG] (last visited Apr. 10, 2021).
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DEBATES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ABSTRACT
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

Despite absorbing and learning about many legal notions and
theories from common law systems, the whole administrative law
framework in China represents the heritage of civil law systems. In
China, government departments govern society through
administrative actions. Academically, all the administrative actions
can be classified into two groups: (1) “specific” or “concrete” (juti)
administrative action, which was covered by the ALL for the first
time since 1989 and became a legal term in codified laws instead of
a merely an academic term in textbooks; 14 and (2) “abstract”
(chouxiang) administrative action, which is merely an academic term
that is not used in any official law or legal document.15 “Specific
administrative action” refers to the action that is applied to concrete
persons and situations, such as administrative penalty, administrative
license, and administrative compulsion and requisition. “Abstract
administrative action” refers to the action that can be applied
generally and in the future. 16 The classification approximately
equates to rulemaking and adjudication in the U. S. 17
Although it is difficult to figure out precisely the distinction
between specific administrative action and abstract administrative
14

Juti Xingzheng Xingwei (具体行政行为) [Specific Administrative
Action] was substituted by Xingzheng Xingwei (行政行为) [Administrative
Action] when the Original ALL was revised in 2014. See Revised ALL
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014,
effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., art. 13.
15
See Yang Haikun (杨海坤), Dishierzhang Xingzheng Xingwei (第十二章
行政行为 [Chapter 12 Administative Actions], in DANGDAI ZHONGGUO
XINGZHENGFA (当代中国行政法) [Contemporary Administrative Law in China]
(Ying Songnian (应松年) ed., 2018) 783; XINGZHENGFA XUE (行政法学)
[SCIENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 124 (Hu Jianmiao (胡建淼) ed., 2015).
16
Id.
17
Adjudication in the US includes the administrative reconsideration and the
administrative adjudication in China, so it is broader than specific administrative
actions in China. Roughly speaking, we can regard specific administrative
actions as adjudication. See Wang Jing(王静), Meiguo Xingzhengfa Faguan
Zhidu Yanjiu (美国行政法法官制度研究) [Research on the ALJs in the U.S.],
GUOJIA XINGZHENG XUEYUAN CHUBANSHE (国家行政学院出版社) [CHINESE
ACADEMY OF GOVERNANCE PUBLISHER] 1, 23–24 (2019).
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action—and occasionally people have different opinions on the
nature of certain action 18 —this classification remains the most
important way to understand debates in administrative litigation in
China. Article 12 in the Original ALL clearly provides that courts
only have jurisdiction over specific administrative actions. 19 That
means other actions, including abstract administrative actions, cannot
be subjects of administrative litigation in the past.20 Courts cannot
declare that an abstract administrative action is illegal and repeal or
annul its effect. Professor Zhang Qianfan believed that “this is one
of its few peculiar ‘Chinese characteristics.’”21 However, in practice,
18

An example of one on the border is a notice made by the former Ministry
of Railways, which was dissolved and transferred duties to the Ministry of
Transport, State Railways Administration, and China Railway Corporation last
year. It announced that the train ticket prices during Chinese Lunar New Year
Festival would be raised. Concerning the nature of this notice, the first instance
court, the court of appeals, the plaintiff, the defendant, and the legal experts all
had different opinions. See Tang Yingying (唐莹莹) & Chen Xingyan (陈星言),
Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei Kesuxing Tanxi: Cong Qiao Zhanxiang Su
Tiedaobu Chunyun Piaojia Shangfuan Tanqi (抽象行政行为可诉性探析：从乔
占祥诉铁道部春运票价上浮案谈起) [Analysis on Justiciability of Abstract
Administrative Actions: From Qiao Zhanxiang v. Ministry of Railways], 19 FALV
SHIYONG (法律适用) [LEGAL APPLICATION] 65, 65–67 (2004) (explaining the
justifiability of abstract administrative actions).
19
Original ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ., art. 12.
20
Article 13 of the Original ALL excludes four kinds of actions in
administrative litigation, for example, abstract administrative actions which are
expressed as “administrative regulations and rules or decisions and orders with
general binding force developed and issued by administrative organs.” Three
other kinds of excluded actions are “actions taken by the state in national defense
and foreign affairs” ,“decisions of administrative agencies on rewards or
punishments for their employees or the appointment or removal from offices of
their employees” and “administrative action taken by an administrative agency as
a final adjudication according to the law.” These above limitations on the scope
of jurisdiction over administrative litigation cases may also be changed because
the scholars strongly proposed to expand the scope of judicial review to so-called
internal administrative actions, especially those important decisions rendered by
the administrative organs to the civil servants about appointment, removal, and
punishment. Original ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S
CONG. GAZ., art. 13.
21
Zhang Qianfan, From Administrative Rule of Law to Constitutionalism?, 3
ASIA L. REV. 47, 57 (2006).
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abstract administrative actions often have greater impact on people
and society than specific administrative actions. That is the reason
why scholars and experts have discussed the necessity and feasibility
of judicial review of abstract administrative actions many times since
the ALL was drafted in the 1980s.22
In 1989, in Wang Hanbin’s introduction and interpretation of
drafting of the ALL to the Standing Committee of the NPC, the scope
of the court’s jurisdiction in administrative cases was the first
important issue identified that should be resolved in the ALL and
should be decided according to some principles. 23 Wang Hanbin
mentioned that the scope of review should “be enlarged appropriately”
and “neither interfere in administrative actions . . . nor substitute
the administration to exercise administrative power”.24 He also used
phrases like “actual situations” and “be expanded step by step” which
can be seen as the key words to confine the scope of court’s
jurisdiction.25 The legislators believed that at the time, based on the
22

Luo Wenyan (罗文燕), Dui Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei Jinxing Sifa
Shencha de Falv Sikao (对抽象行政行为进行司法审查的法律思考) [Legal Idea
of Judicial Review of Abstract Administrative Actions], 4 HANGZHOU DAXUE
XUEBAO (杭州大学学报) [J. HANGZHOU UNIV.] 23, 23–29 (1996); Gao Hong(高
鸿), Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei Kesuxing Yanjiu (抽象行政行为可诉性研究)
[Research on Sueability of Abstratct Administrative Actions), 4 FALV KEXUE(法
律科学) [SCIENCE OF LAW] 33, 33–39(1997); Ma Huaide(马怀德), Xi Chouxiang
Xingzheng Xingwei Naru Susong Fanwei zhi Biyaoxing (析抽象行政行为纳入诉
讼范围之必要性) [Necessity of Judicial Review of Abstract Administrative
Law], 10 RENMIN JIANCHA (人民检察) [PEOPLE'S PROSECUTORIAL MONTHLY]
12, 12–15 (2001); Gan Wen (甘文), Dui Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei de Sifa
Shencha (对抽象行政行为的司法审查) [Judicial Review of Abstract
Administrative Actions], 4 RENMIN SIFA (人民司法) [THE PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE]
52, 52–53(2002); Lu Weifu (陆维福), Dui Guifanxing Wenjian Shencha Yingdang
cong Xingzheng Fuyi Yanshendao Sifa Shencha (对规范性文件审查应当从行政
复议延伸到司法审查) [Review of Regulatory Documents Shall be Conducted in
Judicial Review so does in Administrative Reconsideration), 2 XUESHUJIE (学术
界) [ACADEMICS IN CHINA] 233, 233–237 (2005).
23
Wang Hanbin (王汉斌), Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng
Susongfa (Caoan) de Shuoming (关于中华人民共和国行政诉讼法(草案)的说
明) [Interpretation on the Draft of Administrative Litigation Law of People’s
Republic of China], 5 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 11, 12 (1989).
24
Id.
25
Id.
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actual circumstances, because the administrative litigation really was
a new legal mechanism, administrative organs needed some time to
cope with it and courts also needed to accumulate experience, courts
should review administrative actions, but not all actions, especially
those documents with a general binding effect. Thus, the legislature
chose specific administrative actions as the subject of judicial review
in the Original ALL draft.26 Since promulgation of the Original ALL,
the debate about whether judicial review should be expanded to
abstract administrative actions has remained hot. Many scholars and
officials have proposed expanding judicial review to more abstract
administrative actions, whereas others have opposed doing so. For
example, Professor Zou Rong insisted that abstract administrative
actions cannot be challenged in administrative litigation because we
cannot design a feasible system to do so.27 Professor Liu Xin also
opposed expanding the scope of administrative litigation to abstract
administrative actions because the courts were not equipped to review
them at that time. 28 Even though the discussion about expanding
judicial review to abstract administrative actions is a broader one, it
has come to focus especially on low-level regulatory documents for
which review is more feasible and acceptable. Professor Ying
Songnian and Professor Yang Weidong thought in 2004 that
accepting the regulatory documents under rules in judicial review was

26

Zhang Weiwei (张维炜), Yichang Dianfu Guanguiminjian de Lifa
Geming: Xingzheng Susongfa Dansheng Lu (一场颠覆”官贵民贱”的立法革命：
行政诉讼法诞生录) [A Legislative Revolution to Overturn the Relationship
between the Officials and the Ordinary People: Memory of Drafting the
Administrative Litigation Law], 33 ZHONGGUO RENDA ZAZHI(中国人大杂志)
[THE PEOPLE’S CONG. OF CHINA] 21, 23 (2014).
27
Zou Rong (邹荣), Xingzheng Guifan Sifa Shencha de Lujing (行政规范司
法审查的路径) [The Way towards Judicial Review of Administrative Regulatory
Documents], 15 HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO (华东政法大学学报)
[ECUPL. L. J.] 118, 119 (2012).
28
Liu Xin (刘莘), Guanyu Xingzheng Susong Falv Shiyong Zhidu Xiugai de
Sikao (关于行政诉讼法律适用制度修改的思考) [Thoughts on Revision of
Legal Application in Administrative Litigation], 107 SUZHOU DAXUE XUEBAO(苏
州大学学报) [SUZHOU U. J.] 67, 70 (2012).
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better, 29 which was accepted by most people in academia and the
legal practice.30

II.

REASONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATORY
DOCUMENTS IN CHINA

With a highly centralized system of government, hierarchical
control plays a role in China. It presumes that higher authority has
more power than lower authority, so legal documents stipulated by a
higher authority are more authoritative than those stipulated by a
lower authority.31 As China develops its market economy, more and
more legislations and regulations are passed, increasing the internal
legal conflicts among different government departments. In 2000,
the NPC passed the Legislation Law (lifa fa), which aimed to
establish rules for various legislative activities, including legislation
at the NPC and local People’s Congress levels, and administrative
legislation by the State Council, its ministries, and local
governments.32 The Legislation Law sets constraints for legislative
bodies’ authority as well as procedural requirements based on the
ALL. The term “regulatory documents” has a special meaning in

29

Ying Songnian (应松年) & Yang Weidong (杨伟东), Xingzheng Susong
Xiuzheng Chubu Gouxiang Shang (行政诉讼修正初步构想(上)) [Primary Idea
about Revision of the ALL I], 10 ZHONGGUO SIFA(中国司法) [JUST. OF CHINA]
28, 31 (2004).
30
Lu Weifu (陆维福), Dui Guifanxing Wenjian Shencha Yingdang cong
Xingzheng Fuyi Yanshendao Sifa Shencha ( 对规范性文件审查应当从行政复议
延伸到司法审查) [Regulatory Documents Shall Be Reviewed in Judicial
Procedure as Does in Administrative Reconsideration), 2 XUESHUJIE (学术界)
[ACADEMICS] 233, 233–237(2005); Wang Zhenmin(王振民), Dui Guifanxing
Wenjian Jinxing Sifa Shencha de Sange Tezheng (对规范性文件进行司法审查
的三个特征) [Three Characteristics of Judicial Review of Regulatory
Documents), 10 ZHONGGUO SHENPAN (中国审判) [CHINA TRIAL] 14, 14–15
(2015).
31
LIU XIN (刘莘), XINGZHENG LIFA YUANLI YU SHIWU (行政立法原理与实
务) [Theory and Practice of Administrative Legislation] (ZHONGGUO FAZHI
CHUBANSHE (中国法制出版社) [CHINA LEGAL PUBLISHING HOUSE]) 26(2014)
32
Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 31 (China).
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Chinese administrative law. 33 Textually, abstract administrative
actions include “administrative regulations” (xingzheng fagui), “rules”
(guizhang), and decisions and orders with general binding force
formulated and announced by the administration bodies.34 Among
these documents, administrative rules and regulations are stipulated
in the Legislation Law and are called “administrative legislation”
(xingzheng lifa). Other decisions and orders with general binding
force are called “regulatory documents” (guifanxing wenjian), “other
regulatory documents” (qita guifanxing wenjian) or “administrative
regulatory documents”(xingzeng guifanxing wenjian). 35 Thus,
normally in textbooks and academic articles, abstract administrative
actions consist of two categories—administrative legislation and
regulatory documents. 36 As to the relationship and differences
among these terms, please refer to the Table about Authorities of
Administrative Legislation and Regulatory Documents below. 37
There is no constitutional court or constitutional review in
China up to the present, so any dispute about the legal documents
33
See Dong Hao (董皞), Dishisanzhang Xingzheng Lifa(第十三章 行政立
法)[Chapter 13 Administrative Legislation], in DANGDAI ZHONGGUO
XINGZHENGFA (当代中国行政法) [Contemporary Administrative Law in China]
(Ying Songnian (应松年) ed., 2018) 831.
34
Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 31 (China).
35
Sometimes regulatory documents, in the context of the Chinese
constitutional structure, refer to broader documents that are stipulated not only by
the administration but also by the legislative and other entities which have the
authority to establish rules, including the courts and the prosecutors. Mo Jihong
(莫纪宏), Guifanxing Wenjian Beian Shencha Zhidu de Hefaxing Yanjiu (规范性
文件备案审查制度的“合法性”研究) [Study on the Legitimacy of the Reference
and the Review Systems for Regulatory Documents], 10 BEIJING LIANHE DAXUE
XUEBAO (RENWEN SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) (北京联合大学学报(人文社会科学版))
[J. OF BEIJING UNION U. (HUMANITIES & SOC. SCI.)] 104, 107 (2012).
36
Because regulatory documents are always published with a red title, they
are also called Hongtou Wenjian [Red-headed Documents], meaning documents
that have red titles and red stamps. “Red-headed” in the Modern Chinese
Dictionary refers to documents announced and published by the Party and
government institutions, often at the central level, whose names came from the
red printed title of the documents. XIANDAI HANYU CIDIAN (现代汉语词典)
[MODERN CHINESE DICTIONARY] (Dictionary Editing Room at the Inst. of
Linguistics CASS ed., 6th ed. 2012).
37
Infra Table.
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passed by the NPC and the local People’s Congresses cannot be
submitted to courts. In the Chinese constitutional structure, the NPC
has both the supreme status and the highest authority. Both the State
Council and the Supreme People’s Court are established by the NPC.
Thus, it is impossible and inappropriate to supervise the NPC’s
legislation through judicial review. Further, since upper-level
documents belong to the category of legislation and are called
“administrative legislation,” upper-level documents should not be
challenged in courts. 38
Another explanation of why the control and supervision of
regulatory documents should be prioritized is the reality of these
documents. In short, regulatory documents create many problems.39
The reasons regulatory documents are problematic are as follows:
First, the number of regulatory documents is considerable, so
problems they cause seem more obvious. According to Article 90 of
the Constitution of China, upper-level governments have the
authority to issue decisions and orders. “Ministries and commissions
issue orders, directives and regulations within the jurisdiction of their
respective departments and in accordance with statutes,
administrative rules and regulations, decisions and orders issued by
the State Council.”40 Similar provisions also appear in Article 107 of
the Constitution of China, which grant power to lower level
governments to issue such documents. 41 Therefore, not only do

38

Qin Qianhong (秦前红) & Ye Haibo (叶海波), Xianfa Susong: Yige
Pipanxing Fenxi (宪法诉讼: 一个批判分析) [Constitutional Litigation:Critical
Analysis], 2 HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO (华东政法大学学报) [ECUPL.
L. J.] 12, 12–17(2003).
39
Zhan Zhongle (湛中乐), Lun Xingzheng Fagui, Xingzheng Guizhang
Yiwai de Qita Guifanxing Wenjian (论行政法规、行政规章以外的其他规范性
文件) [Discussion on Other Regulatory Documents except Administrative
Regulations and Administrative Rules], 9 ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA LEGAL SCI.]
108, 112 (1992).
40
The decisions and orders issued include both regulatory documents with
general binding and specific actions with specific binding. XIANFA (宪法)
[Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982, effective Dec. 4, 1982, amended Mar. 14, 2004),
art. 90 (China).
41
Article 107 of the Constitution provides that people’s governments of
townships, nationality townships, and towns carry out the resolutions of the
people’s congress at the corresponding level as well as decisions and orders of the
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provincial and larger city governments issue regulatory documents,
but all local governments at different levels have authority to
formulate various regulatory documents. 42 That means local
governments at various levels, the central government, and its
ministries and commissions all formulate regulatory documents.
These governments and agencies have long counted on regulatory
documents to exercise administrative power because regulatory
documents always have a general application and have the force of
law in practice. It is said that 85% of effective documents in the
administration are regulatory documents made by governments at
various levels.43 Based on the estimated number of the authorities
which can establish regulatory documents, as shown in the following
table, it is difficult to calculate the exact number of regulatory
documents formulated nationwide. 44 Due to the huge scale of
regulatory documents, related problems, including conflicts among
documents issued at different levels, are inevitable.
Documents
Administrative
Legislation

Administrative
Regulations

Authorities

Number of
Authorities

State Council

1

state administrative organs at the next higher level, and conduct administrative
work in their respective administrative areas. XIANFA, art. 107 (1982) (China).
42
XIANFA, art. 107 (1982) (China).
43
Wu Jing (吴兢), Rang Gongzhong Youquan Zhuanggao Hongtou Wenjian
(让公众有权状告“红头文件”) [Let the Public Have the Right to Sue “Redheaded Documents”], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Apr. 18,
2007),
http://kns.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CCND&dbname=CCND200
7&filename=RMRB200704180131&uid=WEEvREcwSlJHSldRa1FhdkJkcGkxU
DROallOM [http://perma.cc/22WM-ZFBA].
44
The number of regulatory documents passed by State Council is 150. And
the number of regulatory documents passed by ministries and commissions of the
State Council is 92,917. See PEKING UNIVERSITY LEGAL INFORMATION
NETWORK, www.Pkulaw.cn [https://perma.cc/NR9W-GS4X] (last visited Apr. 10,
2021). The number of regulatory documents passed by local governments and
their bureaus and offices is unclear. The author conservatively estimate that it is
in the millions.
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Administrative
Rules45

48

Local Rules

45

341

Ministries and
Commissions
under State
Council46

26 ministries,
commissions, and other
organs endowed with
administrative
functions directly under
State Council47

Provincial and
municipal
governments
with subordinate
districts

34 provincial
governments, and 284
municipal cities with
subordinate districts49

The number of rules passed by ministries and commissions of the State
Council is 5,816. See LAWS & REGULATIONS DATABASE,
http://search.chinalaw.gov.cn/search2.html [https://perma.cc/Z5WQ-MGLE].
46
Article 80 of the Legislation Law provides, “[t]he ministries and
commissions of the State Council, the People's Bank of China, the State Audit
Administration, and other divisions with administrative functions directly under
the State Council may, in accordance with the laws and the administrative
regulations, decisions, and orders of the State Council, develop rules within their
respective power.” Lifa Fa (2015 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共和国立法法(2015 修
正)) [The Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China (2015
Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective
July 1, 2000, amended Mar. 15, 2015), art. 80, translated in Lawinfochina
[hereafter Revised Lifa Fa].
47
Wang Yong (王勇), Guanyu Guowuyuan Jigou Gaige Fang’an de
Shuoming (关于国务院机构改革方案的说明) [The Interpretation of Reform
Program of The State Council] (Mar. 14, 2018, 03:03 AM),
http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018-03/14/content_5273856.htm
[https://perma.cc/E4KZ-646J].
48
The number of rules passed by local governments is 30,750. See LAWS &
REGULATIONS DATABASE, supra note 44.
49
Before the Legislation Law was revised in 2015, municipal authorities
with the power to enact local rules mainly referred to 49 larger cities, including 27
provincial capital cities, 18 larger cities approved by the State Council, and 4
cities where special economic regions are located. Lifa Fa (2000 Xiuzheng) (中
华人民共和国立法法) [Law on Legislation Legislation of the People’s Republic
of China], art. 63, 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 31
(China). According to the revision of the Legislation Law in 2015, all 284 cities
with subordinate districts, instead of larger cities, have local legislative power, but
only on managing city affairs, including urban construction, city appearance
management, and environmental protection. Revised Lifa Fa (promulgated by the
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000, amended Mar. 15,
2015), art. 72, translated in Lawinfochina.
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Superior
authorities,
lower
governments,
and related
bureaus and
subordinates

[Vol. 16

More than 43,000
authorities50

Table: Authorities of Administrative Legislation and Regulatory Documents

Secondly, in practice, regulatory documents are always direct
guidelines for civil servants to execute laws and exercise
administrative power. In Chinese bureaucracy, civil servants in lower
level governments and agencies are reluctant to check upper level
legal documents and usually would directly apply the regulatory
documents announced by themselves or superior organs. So even if
there is something wrong with the regulatory documents,
administrative organs still tend to comply with them in rendering
administrative decisions, such as administrative penalties or orders of
relocation and home demolition.51
50

As of September 2016, there were 34 provincial governments and 334
prefectural level governments (diji xingzhengqu), including 294 prefectural cities
(dijishi), but only 49 larger cities with the authority to formulate local rules before
the revision of the Legislation Law in 2015. Now 284 cities with subordinate
districts also have limited authorities to formulate local rules. Li Jianguo(李建国),
Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifafa Xiuzheng'an Caoan de Shuoming
(关于《中华人民共和国立法法修正案(草案)》的说明) [Interpretation on the
Draft of Legislation Law Amendment of People’s Republic of China],ZHONGGUO
RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC],
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2015-05/07/content_1939099.htm. Last
visited Apr 13, 2021. For the governments at the county level, there are 1,464
counties in China out of a total of 2,851. There are 40,703 governments at the
village (town) level. It is impossible to calculate the number of bureaus and other
subordinates local governments, which are also authorized to formulate regulatory
documents. So the number of authorities must greatly exceed the county-level
divisions, including autonomous counties, county-level cities, banners,
autonomous banners, autonomous counties, county-level cities, banners,
autonomous banners, and city districts. Peng Dongyu (彭东昱), Fuyu Shequ de
Shi Difang Lifaquan (赋予设区的市地方立法权) [Authorization of Legislation
Power to Cities with Subordinates], 19 ZHONGGUO RENDA ZAZHI (中国人大杂
志) [THE PEOPLE’S CONG. OF CHINA] 25, 25–26 (2014).
51
In 2009, Ms. Da Lijuan was denied from taking the entrance examination
for public school teacher positions because she was 149 cm tall. According to the
regulatory document stipulated by the Hunan Education Bureau, the height
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Furthermore, regulatory documents lack enough supervision
and procedural controls. Compared to administrative legislation,
clear mandatory requirements for issuing regulatory documents are
not enough. In the Regulations on Rules Legislation Procedure
(Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli) promulgated by the State
Council in 2001, Article 36 provides that local governments above
the county level, which do not have the authority to formulate rules,
shall take the procedure in that Regulation as reference to formulate
and publish decisions and orders with general binding force.52 More
and more provinces and cities announced local rules on the procedure
of the regulatory documents. On May 31, 2018, the General Office
of the State Council required all governments and departments to
obey the rule of law, control the number of regulatory documents,
complete the process, and hear public opinions and expert
suggestions.53 Nevertheless, most of the procedural requirements of
requirement for female teachers is 150 cm and 160 cm for male teachers. But in
the related documents of the Education Ministry, the Health Ministry under the
State Council, and the China Disabilities Association, there was no height
requirement. Therefore, Ms. Da, along with three male candidates who were
under 160 cm in height, sued the Education Bureau. Though they failed in the
administrative litigation, Hunan Education Bureau deleted the height requirement
article in its regulatory document. Shen Xinwang (申欣旺) & Bai Zukai (白祖
偕), “Xunfu Quanli” de Shiyan (“驯服权力”的实验) [Experiment to Tame the
Power], ZHONGGUO XINWEN ZHOUKAN (中国新闻周刊) [CHINA NEWSWEEK],
May 17, 2010, at 26.
52
Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli (规章制定程序条例) [Regulations on
Procedures for the Formulation of Rules ] (promulgated by the St. Council, Nov.
16, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), 2001 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ. 322, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61556.htm
[https://perma.cc/THH7-Q76T].
53
Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Jiaqiang Xingzheng Guifanxing
Wenjian Zhiding he Jiandu Guanli Gongzuo de Tongzhi (国务院办公厅关于加
强行政规范性文件制定和监督管理工作的通知) [Notice to Strengthen
Enactment and Supervision of Administrative Regulatory Documents] (published
by the General Office of the State Council) (promulgated by the General Office of
the State Council, May 31, 2018), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201805/31/content_5295071.htm [https://perma.cc/WNU2-CA2Y]. Another important
document is Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Quanmian Tuixing Xingzheng
Guifanxing Wenjian Hefaxing Shenhe Jizhi de Zhidao Yijian (关于全面推行行
政规范性文件合法性审核机制的指导意见) [Guidance on Completely Pushing
Forward Legal Review of Administrative Regulatory Documents] (promulgated
by the General Office of the State Council, effective Dec. 20, 2018),
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regulatory documents were not spelled out clearly and tended to be
handled internally rather than via standardized external channels, for
example, allowing public participation and ensuring transparency.
According to Yang Shujun’s research, 31 provincial governments and
21 provincial rules provided that only governments have the power
to draft regulatory documents; although people pay more attention to
the hearing and other methods of collecting public opinion, local rules
do not give clear and efficient provisions about requirements for and
methods of public participation.54
Regulatory documents are used to issue licenses, assess
penalties, apply compulsory enforcement, acquire goods and services,
and perform other actions. They are usually in the form of decisions,
orders, notices, and even meeting summaries, involving salary, social
benefits, endowment insurance, awards for investment promotion,
and so on. Consequently, it is not very difficult to find some
problematic examples. For instance, before the Administrative
Licensing Law took effect in 2004, various documents established
administrative licenses and permits. One local government published
a regulatory document requiring all producers of steamed bread
(mantou) to get a permit from the steam bread administration offices,
which touched upon the most popular and traditional staple food in
northern China. The farce finally ended after the city office battled
with the district office when both of them went to investigate the same

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-12/20/content_5350427.htm
[https://perma.cc/WNU2-CA2Y].
54
Yang Shujun conducted research on the local rules of regulatory procedure.
He found that out of 80 local governments with the authority to provide local
rules, 46 of them passed local rules to regulate the procedures of regulatory
documents. Notably, out of 31 provincial governments, 21 provincial
governments passed local rules on the procedure of the regulatory documents and
most of the local rules used the term “regulatory documents” while other rules
used the term “administrative regulatory documents” and “administrative organs
regulatory documents.” Yang Shujun (杨书军), Guifanxing Wenjian Zhiding
Chengxu Lifa de Xianzhuang ji Wanshan (规范性文件制定程序立法的现状及
完善) [Current Situations and Improvement of Legislation for the Procedures of
Regulatory Documents], 21 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU (行政法学研究) [ADMIN.
L. REV.] 86, 86–87 (2013).
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food workshop at the same time.55 This type of example 56 is the
reason why China has the Administrative Licensing Law to govern
permits and licenses, and why the law provides clearly that
documents at different levels can only stipulate certain types of
permits and licenses, and that regulatory documents cannot establish
any permit and license. However, the results of executing this law
are unsatisfactory.
Overall, it is necessary to review regulatory documents in
China in order to protect the rights and interests of citizens. It is
especially important for courts to contribute to this goal and push
forward advancement of the rule of law in China.
Additionally, judges and courts have the capacity to review
abstract administrative actions. In the discussion about the possibility
of reviewing abstract administrative actions, including regulatory
documents, some scholars argued that courts and judges were
incompetent to review abstract administrative actions. 57 The
55

Liu Xuezeng (刘学增), Shenbian Linshi Bangongshi Pandian: Zhengzhou
ceng Chengli Mantouban (身边临时办公室盘点: 郑州曾成立馒头办)
[Summary of Temporary Offices in Daily Life: Offices of Steamed Bread
Administration once were Established in Zhengzhou], DAHAEBAO (大河报)
[GREAT RIVER NEWS] (Sept. 17, 2014).
56
It is not difficult to find other similar examples. In 2007, Pinghe County
Government in Fujian Province published regulatory documents providing that
young men without a junior high school diploma would not be eligible to obtain
certificates of labor, labor permits, marriage certificates, or driver’s licenses from
governments at the village level or the education departments including but not
limited to, education, labor, industry and commerce, public security, civil
administration. Such actions were criticized and later canceled by the
government. See Lin Xiaoqi (林晓琪), Fujian Pinghe Guiding Weiqude
Chuzhong Biyezhengzhe Buneng Banli Jiehunzheng (福建平和规定未取得初中
毕业证者不能办理结婚证) [Pinghe County Government in Fujian Stipulated,
No Junior High School Diploma, No Marriage Certificate], DONGNAN KUAIBAO
(东南快报) [SOUTHEAST EXPRESS] (Mar. 28, 2007)
See also IUD Zhongguo Zhengwu Jingqi Jiance Zhongxin (IUD 中国政务
景气监测中心) [IUD Chinese Gov’t Aff. Situation Monitoring Center], 2009
Nian Liuda Zuiju Zhengyixing “Hongtou Wenjian” (2009 年六大最具争议性“红
头文件”) [The Six Most Controversial Red-headed Documents in 2009], 16
LINGDAO JUECE XINXI ZHOUKAN(领导决策信息周刊) [INFO. FOR DECIDERS
MAG.] 16, 16–17 (2009).
57
Liu Junxiang(刘俊祥),Lun Woguo Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei de Sifa
Shencha (论我国抽象行政行为的司法审查) [Judicial Review of Abstract
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arguments mainly focused on the following points. First, at least
according to legal provisions, abstract administrative actions made by
governments are the collective product of discussions and
government conferences. The head of the government cannot decide
to issue it by himself without any discussion with other administrative
officials, especially roughly same-level officials.
Hence,
theoretically, since abstract administrative actions are decided by a
group of people, it is improper for one judge or several judges to
reverse them, or even review them. Second, judges do not have the
expertise needed to review abstract administrative actions, compared
to the expertise of the officers in the governments. Third, it is not
easy for courts to review specific administrative actions, so it will be
even harder for them to review abstract administrative actions. This
debate ended after Revised ALL was passed. But the issues remain
in practice.

III.

JURISDICTION OF COURTS OVER REGULATORY
DOCUMENTS IN THE PAST

Whether the Revised ALL in 2014 is to expand judicial
review to regulatory documents is controversial because from the
perspective of some academics and judges, courts already have
jurisdiction over abstract administrative actions to some extent.58 In
the Original ALL, Articles 5259 and 5360 provided that the court shall
take laws, administrative regulations, and local regulations as the
legal basis for specific administrative actions, which is called “taking
as legal basis” (yiju). And the court shall take rules as reference,
which is called “reference” (canzhao). “Taking as a legal basis” and
Administrative Actions), XIANDAI FAXUE(现代法学) [MODERN LAW SCIENCE]
69, 69–74(1999).
58
See Wang Tiancheng (王天成), Zhirenzhe Zhiyufa—Xingzhengfa yu
Renquan (治人者治于法—行政法与人权) [Governor Who Governs People
Shall be Governed by Law—Administrative Law and Human Rights], 14
ZHONGWAI FAXUE (中外法学) [PEKING U. L. J.] 29, 34 (1992).
59
Original ALL, (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ., arts. 52.
60
Original ALL, (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ., art. 53.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

2021]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

347

“reference” are different according to the intent of the legislators.
“Taking as a legal basis” means that law, administrative regulations,
and local regulations are binding and courts cannot review their
legality and shall respect and obey them. But “reference” is different
from “taking as a legal basis” in that a rule may or may not be binding
depending on its legality. Wang Hanbin’s introduction and
explanation of drafting the ALL for the Standing Committee of the
NPC noted that there were varying opinions about “reference. ” He
explained, “if the rule is consistent with laws and administrative
regulations, the court shall take it as the reference; and if the rule is
inconsistent or not totally consistent with principles and spirit of laws
and administrative regulations, the court may have the room to deal
with regulations freely”. 61 In the 1990s, there were two sorts of
opinions concerning whether the court can review abstract
administrative actions: most did not think the court possessed the
authority to review abstract administrative actions, including
Professor Luo Haocai and Professor Ying Songnian, who were the
deputy directors of the Administrative Legislation Team under the
Standing Committee of the NPC. 62 Meanwhile, some scholars
argued the court did, if fact, have the authority.63
In May 2004, Guanyu Shenli Xingzheng Anjian Shiyong Falv
Guifan Wenti de Zuotanhui Jiyao [Summary of Seminar on
Application of Legal Documents in the Trial of Administrative Cases]
(“2004 Summary”), published by the Supreme People’s Court, which
is not a formal judicial interpretation, but is always regarded as
among the most important guidance for courts, stipulated that if
61

Wang Hanbin (王汉斌), Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng
Susongfa (Caoan) de Shuoming (关于《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法(草案)》的
说明) [Interpretation on the Draft of Administrative Litigation Law of People’s
Republic of China], 5 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZUIGAO RENMIN
FAYUAN GONGBAO (最高人民法院公报) [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ] 11, 12–13
(1989).
62
LUO HAOCAI (罗豪才), ZHONGGUO SIFA SHENCHA ZHIDU (中国司法审查
制度) [JUDICIAL REVIEW SYSTEM IN CHINA] 15–16 (Luo Haocai ed., 2003); YING
SONGNIAN (应松年) XINGZHENG SUSONG FAXUE (行政诉讼法学) [SCIENCE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION] 88 (Ying Songnian et al. eds., 1994).
63
Wang Tiancheng (王天成), Zhirenzhe Zhiyufa—Xingzhengfa yu Renquan
(治人者治于法—行政法与人权) [Governor Who Governs People Shall be
Governed by Law—Administrative Law and Human Rights], 14 ZHONGWAI
FAXUE (中外法学) [PEKING U. L. J.] 29, 34 (1992).
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courts identify concrete applicable interpretations and other
regulatory documents which are guidelines of specific administrative
actions, as legal, effective, and reasonable after reviewing them,
courts shall confirm the effect of the regulatory documents when
confirming the legitimacy of specific administrative actions.
Otherwise, courts can refuse to apply regulatory documents, which is
called “non-application” (bushiyong). 64 Later, more scholars and
experts expressed their ideas about it. Jiang Bixin, the former Vice
President of the Supreme People’s Court, stated that the ALL
authorizes courts to review regulatory documents and to confirm
whether regulatory documents are legal or not. 65 Professor Xing
Hongfei stated that the idea that abstract administrative actions
cannot be judicially reviewed was a misunderstanding, and that
courts can conduct judicial review of abstract administrative actions
without any violation of current legal provisions.66
From the above legal provisions, some scholars and judges
argue that while the defendant bears the burden of proof in
challenging the legality of regulatory documents and courts shall
review their legality instead of applying them directly, courts already
have jurisdiction over abstract administrative documents. In fact, in
early 1996, Dr. Shi Hongxin, who later became a judge in a Beijing
court, argued that the difference between the supporting view and
opposing opinion was how to define the judicial review.67 If the non-

64

Guanyu Shenli Xingzheng Anjian Shiyong Falv Guifan Wenti de
Zuotanhui Jiyao (关于审理行政案例适用法律规范问题的座谈会纪要)
[Summary of Seminar on Application of Legal Documents in the Trial of
Administrative Cases], RENMIN FAYUANBAO(最高人民法院公报) [PEOPLE’S CT.
DAILY], June 1, 2004.
65
Jiang Bixin (江必新), Xingzheng Susong yu Chouxiang Xingzheng
Xingwei (《行政诉讼法》与抽象行政行为) [Administrative Litigation Law and
Abstract Administrative Actions], 12 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU(行政法学研究)
[ADMIN. L. REV.] 13, 13–14, 23 (2009).
66
Xing Hongfei (邢鸿飞), Jinqu Haishi Wuqu? Chouxiang Xingzheng
Xingwei Sifa Shencha de Xianzhuang ji Chulu (禁区还是误区? 抽象行政行为司
法审查的现状及出路) [Forbidden Zone or Misunderstanding? Present Situations
and Outlets for the Judicial Review of Abstract Administrative Actions], 10
HEHAI DAXUE XUEBAO (河海大学学报) [J. HOHAI U.] 43, 43–47 (2008).
67
Shi Hongxin(石红心), Lun Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei de Sifa Shencha
(论抽象行政行为的司法审查) [On Judicial Review of Abstract Administrative
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application of regulatory documents is classified as judicial review,
judges and courts already have some kind of authority to review both
rules and regulatory documents.68
Nevertheless, in the author’s opinion, non-application of
regulatory documents in administrative litigation cannot be regarded
as a formal mechanism of judicial review. Especially speaking more
broadly, we cannot describe non-application as judicial review. Nonapplication in China is a fleeting decision about legal provisions
rather than a complete and observable judicial review. 69 Because
even if courts find problems in regulatory documents and conclude
that they are illegal or inappropriate—and thus refuse to apply
them—nobody can see a single word or sentence of the judge’s
evaluation of the regulatory documents in the judgment. Apart from
the parties represented in the case and judges presiding, no one is
privy to the interpretation of regulatory documents. If agencies or
governments do not revise or repeal regulatory documents, those who
challenge regulatory documents can bring lawsuits to new judges and
courts who may issue a different judgment. The outcomes of cases
will be uncertain because there is no system to coordinate opinions
across judges and courts. As a result, non-application of regulatory
documents only affects individual cases instead of the broad and
consistent application of regulatory documents. Without supervision
Actions], 3 YANJIUSHENG FAXUE (研究生法学) [GRADUATE L. REV.] 28, 29–33
(1996).
68
Id.
69
Chen Aihua Su Nanjingshi Jiangningqu Zhufang he Chengxiang Jiansheju
Bulvxing Fangwu Dengji Fading Zhizean (陈爱华诉南京市江宁区住房和城乡
建设局不履行房屋登记法定职责案) [Chen Aihua v. the Bureau of Housing and
Urban-Rural Development of Jiangning District, Nanjing City], 2014 SUP.
PEOPLE’S CT GAZ. 8 (Nanjing Interm. People’s Ct. 2013) (Dr. Xu Xiaodong
studied the Chen Aihua case published in the Gazette of the Supreme People’s
Court in 2014 and found the judge did not render direct judgment of the notice of
two ministries, but in the Gazette the Supreme People’s Court expressed clearly
that the notice violated laws and statutes was not binding.). See Xu Xiaodong (徐
肖东), Xingzheng Susong Guifanxing Wenjian Fudai Shencha de Renzhi jiqi
Shixian Jizhi—yi Chen Aihua An yu Huayuan Gongsi An weizhu de Fenxi (行政
诉讼规范性文件附带审查的认知及其实现机制—以陈爱华案与华源公司案
为主的分析) [Recognition and Realization Mechanism of Incidental Review of
regulatory documents in Administrative Litigation: Taking Chen Aihua Case and
Huayuan Gongsi Case as Main Example], 19 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU (行政法
学研究) [ADMIN. L. REV.] 69, 69–83(2016).
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or legal remedy, it is difficult to classify non-application of regulatory
documents as judicial review.
On the other hand, courts and judges often execute nonapplication of regulatory documents differently than we may
expect.70 The conclusions are not taken directly from the ALL; rather,
as Professor Zhu Xinli argues, they are inferred from the ALL. 71
Likewise, the 2004 Summary is not the law or even the formal
judicial interpretation, so the conclusion that courts have jurisdiction
over some abstract administrative actions is not true. The
interpretation is not clear and persuasive enough for all the judges to
understand and handle. As a result, how the courts deal with
regulatory documents depends entirely on particular circumstances
and the ability of judges. Thus, it is not surprising to learn that many
courts and judges, particularly at the grassroots level, prefer to apply
rules and regulatory documents as legal rules instead of judging their
legitimacy before applying them. In Judge Wang Qingting’s 2010
statistics and survey, he drew the conclusion that judges who seldom
review regulatory documents and regulatory documents in
administrative litigation play the role of “invisible law”. 72 If the
judges in Shanghai do not realize they have the power to review
regulatory documents—and in practice they are reluctant to do so—
then it is safe to assume that judges outside of the largest cities such
70

Yu Jun (余军) & Zhangwen (张文), Xingzheng Guifanxing Wenjian Sifa
Shenchaquan de Shixiaoxing Kaocha (行政规范性文件司法审查权的实效性考
察) [Research on Effectiveness of Judicial Review Power of Administrative
Regulatory Documents], 63 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究)[CHINESE JOURNAL OF
LAW] 42, 42–61 (2016).
71
Zhu Xinli (朱新力), Lun Fayuan dui Guizhang Yixia de Xingzheng
Guifanxing Wenjian de Shenchaquan (论法院对规章以下的行政规范性文件的
审查权) [On the Review Power of Regulatory Documents under Rules for the
Courts], 14 FAXUE ZAZHI (法学杂志) [LEGAL SCI. MAG.] 18, 18 (1993).
72
Wang Qingting (王庆廷), Yinxing de “Falü”—Xingzheng Susong zhong
Qita Guifanxing Wenjian de Yihua jiqi Jiaozheng (隐形的”法律”—行政诉讼中
其他规范性文件的异化及其矫正) [Invisible “Law” :The Abnormity and
Correction of Other regulatory documents in Administrative Litigation], XIANDAI
FAXUE PINGLU [MOD. L. SCI.] 82, 82–89 (2011) (Wang Qingting found 30 cases
involving questions about regulatory documents and at the same time sent 50
surveys about this to judges—getting 40 back, which is almost one third of the
whole number of administrative judges in Shanghai. The author is the judge in
the district court in Shanghai.).
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as Beijing and Shanghai will be extremely unlikely to do so. We also
get the same impression from other instances where courts neither
accept cases in which plaintiffs merely claim that regulatory
documents are illegal, nor truly review regulatory documents in
previously accepted cases that are clearly related to regulatory
documents. 73
In sum, there is no real judicial review of regulatory
documents in China before the Revised ALL in 2014. The Revised
ALL is the beginning of judicial review of regulatory documents,
which deserves to be recorded and examined further.

IV.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATORY DOCUMENTS
COOPERATES WITH OTHER MECHANISM

Judicial review is an essential process for correcting and
supervising regulatory documents while cooperating with other
formal and legal channels to scrutinize regulatory documents and
resolve conflicts among them.74
73

See Wang Jing (王静), Cong Xingsu Anjian Kan Laojiao Zhidu Biange
Lujing (从行诉案件看劳教制度变革路径) [Debate on Reform Path of Reeducation through Labor: Administrative Litigation Cases Study], 3 GUOJIA
XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO (国家行政学院学报) [J. CHINESE ACAD. GOV’T.]
97, 97–102 (2012) (Similar situations happen in administrative litigation when
courts have the authority to take the rules as reference. In practice, judges are
reluctant to review the rules. For instance, re-education through labor had been
criticized for many years before the system was abolished by the National
Peoples’ Congress in 2013. Concerning this system, there are two legal
documents: one is the administrative regulations promulgated by the State
Council in 1950s and another one is the rule promulgated by Ministry of Public
Affairs in 1980s. Before 2013, in administrative litigation cases, judges seldom
reviewed the legality of the rule and applied it directly. Only in several cases did
the judges apply the law of the NPC and did not apply the above documents.).
74
See Supreme People’s Court, Xingzheng Susong Fudai Shencha
Guifanxing Wenjian Dianxing Anli Xinwen Fabuhui (行政诉讼附带审查规范性
文件典型案例新闻发布会) [News Release Conference on Typical
Administrative Litigation Cases with Incidental Review of Regulatory
Documents], CHINA COURT.ORG (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:10 AM),
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-125531.html [http://perma.cc/3KYKVCFR] (Huang Yongwei, the chief judge of the administrative tribunal said that
judicial review of regulatory documents is helpful to push forward administration
according to law and legality of regulatory documents and to safeguard
consistence of legal system.).
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The first channel to correct illegal or improper orders and
decisions (including abstract administrative actions) is under the
authority and responsibility of governments at higher levels.75 The
State Council reserves the ability to alter or annul inappropriate
orders, directives, and regulations issued by ministries or
commissions and to alter or annul inappropriate decisions and orders
issued by local organs of state administration at different levels.
Local governments at and above the county level have the power to
alter or annul inappropriate decisions of their subordinate
departments and people’s governments at lower levels.76
The second channel to supervise abstract administrative
actions of local government at various levels is the local people’s
congress at the corresponding level.77 The standing committees of
local people’s congresses at and above the county level have power
to annul inappropriate decisions and orders of government at the
corresponding level. 78 For superior government and congress to
superintend problems of abstract administrative actions, Recording
and Review (Beian Shencha) plays a role. According to the provision
of the Legislation Law and related regulations, administrative
75

XIANFA (宪法) [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982, effective Dec. 4, 1982,
amended Mar. 14, 2004), arts. 89, 108 (2004).
76
Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui he Difang Geji Renmin Zhengfu
Zuzhifa (地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法) [Organic Law of
the Local People's Congress and Local People's Governments of the PRC]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., July.1, 1979, effective July.1, 1979,
amended Aug. 9,2015) (China), art. 59(2004). Article 59 stipulates: A local
people's government at or above the county level shall exercise the following
functions and powers: (3) to alter or annul inappropriate orders and directives of
its subordinate departments and inappropriate decisions and orders of the people's
governments at lower levels.
77
Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui he Difang Geji Renmin Zhengfu
Zuzhifa (地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法) [Organic Law of
the Local People's Congress and Local People's Governments of the PRC]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., July.1, 1979, effective July.1, 1979,
amended Aug. 9,2015)(China), art. 8(2004). Article 8 stipulates: Local people's
congresses at and above the county level shall exercise the following functions
and powers: (11) to annul inappropriate decisions and orders of the people's
governments at the corresponding level.
78
XIANFA (宪法) [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982, effective Dec. 4, 1982,
amended Mar. 14, 2004), art. 104 (2004).
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regulations shall be sent to be recorded and reviewed by the Standing
Committee of National People’s Congress, while the rules of
ministries and local rules of local governments shall be sent to be
recorded and reviewed by superior governments. 79 Regulatory
documents should also be recorded and reviewed by superiors.80 In
the past, superior governments and congresses were reluctant to
review every regulatory document carefully enough to find problems.
Recently, these bodies pay more attention to the Recording and
Review and are making efforts to strengthen it.81
The third method is Sorting Out (Qingli): when a new law or
superior legal document is formulated or revised, governments and
congresses at various levels need to check and revise their own
legislation and regulatory documents to ensure compliance.82 This
method also has its own limitations because the Sorting Out process
79

Revised Lifa Fa (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000,
effective July 1, 2000, amended Mar. 15, 2015), art. 72, translated in
LawinfoChina.
80
Fagui Guizhang Beian Shencha Tiaoli (法规规章备案审查条例)
[Recording and Review of Rules and Regulations] (promulgated by St. Council.,
Dec.14, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002).
81
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Fazhi Gongzuo
Weiyuanhui Fazhi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui Guanyu 2019 nian Beian Shencha
Gongzuo Qingkuang de Baogao (全国人民代表大会常务委员会法制工作委员
会关于 2019 年备案审查工作情况的报告) [Report on Recording and Review in
2019 by Legal Affairs Committee of the Standing Committee of the Nat’l
People’s Cong.], Di Shisan Jie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu
Weiyuanhui Di Shiwu Ci Huiyi (第十三届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十
五次会议) [The 15th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th Nat’l
People’s Cong.] (Dec. 25, 2019),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201912/24cac1938ec44552b285f0708f78c94
4.shtml [https://perma.cc/4BR4-RKSU].
82
In 2011, before Guoyou Tudishang Fangwu Zhengshou Yu Buchang Tiaoli
(国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例)[Regulation on the Expropriation of
Buildings on State-owned Land and Compensation] (promulgated by the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China, January 21, 2011), the governments at
various levels annulled 3,918 regulatory documents and revised 1,410 regulatory
documents. See also Li Li (李立), Quanguo Zhuanxiang Qingli Youguan Zhengdi
Chaiqian Guizhang he Guifanxing Wenjian (全国专项清理有关征地拆迁规章和
规范性文件) [Reviewing Regulatory Documents on Expropriation and House
Removal Nationwide], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [LEGAL DAILY] (Dec. 29, 2011),
http://xueshu.baidu.com/usercenter/paper/show?paperid=05d6836286a845b9bb56
8b172d4c5f25&site=xueshu_se [https://perma.cc/BE6M-RRL2].
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always operates under tight time constraints. Most of ministries of
the State Council and many local governments apply the method
“Three Unification”(San Tongyi) including unified register, unified
coding, and unified announcement. Three Unification first was
adopted in Hunan.83 That means that the authorities must register in
the record at the same time they are given unified codes.84 Only after
the above process has occurred can regulatory documents be
published on the government gazette, specified newspaper, and
official website. Three Unification plays a role in the supervision of
regulatory documents and become an important requirement for
regulatory documents.85
It must be said, however, that the functioning of the
aforementioned channels of review are not as effective as they may
appear at first glance.86 Whether in Recording and Review, Sorting
Out, or Three Unification, there is no correspondent or applicant or
any real dispute, thus each is simply a form of self-examination of
agencies and congresses. After finishing the above measures,
administrative organs and congresses publish a general report about
the number of annulled or altered documents without providing finer
details. Compared to the above channels, allowing ordinary people
83

Hunansheng Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding(湖南省行政程序规
定)[Hunan Provincial Administrative Procedure Provisions] (promulgated by the
Hunan Provincial People’s Government,April 9, 2008,effective Oct 1, 2008) art.
49.
84
Guangxi Shixing Guifanxing Wenjian Santongyi Zhidu (广西实行规范性
文件”三统一”制度) [Guangxi Adopted Three Unification of Regulatory
Documents System], ZHONGGUO CAIJINGBAO (中国财经报) [CHINA FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC NEWS] (Oct.17, 2017),
http://www.cfen.com.cn/dzb/dzb/page_2/201710/t20171017_2722162.html
[https://perma.cc/42Z4-SE8D].
85
Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Jiaqiang Xingzheng Guifanxing
Wenjian Zhiding he Jiandu Guanli Gongzuo de Tongzhi (国务院办公厅关于加
强行政规范性文件制定和监督管理工作的通知) [Notice to Strengthen
Enactment and Supervision of Administrative Regulatory Documents] (published
by the General Office of the State Council) (promulgated by the General Office of
the State Council, May 31, 2018), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201805/31/content_5295071.htm [http://perma.cc/WNU2-CA2Y].
86
See Keith J. Hand, Understanding China’s System for Addressing
Legislative Conflicts: Capacity Challenges and the Search for Legislative
Harmony, COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 26, 139 (2013) (discussing local filing and review
systems).
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to challenge regulatory documents in court has clear advantages.
Only real disputes can test the legality and reasonableness of
regulatory documents accurately and quickly. A plaintiff who brings
forward a concrete infringement of rights or benefits will more
effectively bring attention to problems in regulatory documents. As
Professor Zhan Zhongle said, “[b]y expanding the scope of
administrative jurisdiction, the legitimate rights of the administrative
counterpart can be protected in time”. 87 Using administrative
litigation to correct regulatory documents is more targeted, costs less,
and saves time.
Moreover, there are no conflicts between administrative
litigation and other channels. 88 Judicial review of regulatory
documents cannot substitute other channels. Rather, they will
coordinate together to contribute to the development of rule of law in
China.

V.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATORY DOCUMENTS
PROVIDED IN THE REVISED ALL

Most Chinese officers, judges, and legislators feel more
comfortable with gradual reform in the scope of review under
administrative litigation.89 Extending judicial review to regulatory
documents was considered preferrable to no action or to expanding
judicial review to cover all abstract administrative actions. At the
very least it looked more feasible. Such a plan was realized in the
Revised ALL passed by the NPC Standing Committee in December
87

Zhan Zhongle (湛中乐), Lun Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng
Susongfa De Xiugai (论《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的修改) [On the
Amendment of the Administrative Procedure Law of China], 7 ZHONGGUO
FAXUE QIANYAN (中国法学前沿) [FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA] 211, 214
(2012).
88
See Ye Bifeng(叶必丰), Dishisizhang Xingzheng Guifan(第十四章 行政
规范)[Chapter 14 Administrative Norms], in DANGDAI ZHONGGUO XINGZHENGFA
(当代中国行政法) [Contemporary Administrative Law in China] (Ying Songnian
(应松年) ed., 2018) 968–973.
89
See Ying Songnian (应松年) & Yang Weidong (杨伟东), Woguo
Xingzheng Susongfa Xiuzheng Chubu Shexiang Shang (我国《行政诉讼法》修
正初步设想(上)) [Tentative Ideas on Amending the Administrative Procedure
Law of China I], 10 ZHONGGUO SIFA (中国司法) [JUST. OF CHINA] 28, 28–31
(2004).
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2014. 90 It provided the formal judicial review of regulatory
documents in Article 53 and Article 64. These two articles should be
regarded as the foremost innovation of the administrative litigation
system and a milestone for supervision of administrative organs.91
Those who have not been involved in the long history of debate about
and legislation of the ALL cannot imagine how difficult it is to
stipulate these two articles in the Revised ALL.
Article 53 of the Revised ALL provides:
Where a citizen, a legal person, or any other
organization deems that a regulatory document
developed by a department of the State Council or by
a local people’s government or a department thereof,
based on which the alleged administrative action was
taken, is illegal, the citizen, legal person, or other
organization may concurrently file a request for
review of the regulatory document when filing a
complaint against the administrative action. The term
“regulatory document” as mentioned in the preceding
paragraph does not include administrative rules.92
Article 64 of the Revised ALL provides:
Where, in trying an administrative case, a people’s
court deems that any regulatory document as
mentioned in Article 53 of this Law under its review
is illegal, such a document shall not be used to
determine the legality of the alleged administrative
action, and the people’s court shall provide the

90
Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ.
91
Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ.
92
Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ., art. 53.
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authority developing the document with disposition
recommendations.93
Articles 5394 and Article 6495 include the following important
points: First, courts are granted the authority to review the abstract
administrative actions formally and openly. Second, courts can only
review regulatory documents under rules instead of all abstract
administrative actions. Third, courts can only review regulatory
documents together with specific administrative actions, instead of
accepting separate requests to review the regulatory documents
independently. The plaintiff is allowed to sue a regulatory document
because the sued specific action is caused by the regulatory document.
In order to reduce illegal specific actions, the court need to review
regulatory documents. 96 Thus, the judicial review of regulatory
documents is an incidental review. Fourth, if a court finds that one
regulatory document is illegal, its only recourse is to refuse to apply
the regulatory document. The court may not render a judgment
announcing whether a regulatory document is legal or illegal in the
Revised ALL. Last, the court must submit the recommendation to
the administrative organs which stipulate the regulatory document.
It was a big step for the Revised ALL to expand the scope of
judicial review to regulatory documents.97 Xin Chunying, the vice
93

Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ., art. 64.
94
Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ.
95
Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ.
96
Xin Chunying(信春鹰), Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng
Susongfa Xiuzheng’an Caoan de Shuoming (关于《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法
修正案(草案)》的说明) [Interpretation on the Draft of Administrative Litigation
Law Amendment of People’s Republic of China], ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中
国人大网) [CHINA NPC], http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/201412/23/content_1892443.htm [https://perma.cc/N9UA-KKJW].
97
Yang Weihan (杨维汉), Fayuan Kedui Guizhang Yixia Zhengfu “Hongtou
Wenjian” Fudai Shencha (法院可对规章以下政府“红头文件”附带审查) [The
Court Will Have the Authority to Review the Red-headed Documents below the
Level of Regulations Incidentally], RENMIN WANG (人民网)[PEOPLE’S DAILY
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director of the Legal Affairs Commission of the NPC at the time,
praised that allowing the court to conduct review for regulatory
documents was a symbol of societal progress.98 Judicial review will
no longer be toothless when courts have the power to review
regulatory documents. The author believes that provisions in Article
53 and Article 64 themselves are two significant achievements,99 not
only because courts have the power to supervise more administrative
actions and better protect citizens’ rights and interests, but also
because this change will play an increasing role in strengthening and
improving governance of governments in China.
Meanwhile, due to the uncertain outcome of regulatory
documents regarded as illegal by courts, the Revised ALL is far from
scholarly expectation and aspiration. Perhaps it cannot be regarded
as a complete realization of its ideal design. Rather, it was a
compromise that grew out of different opinions on how to respond to
the need to develop administrative litigation and to the thirst to settle
disputes between citizens and governments in China. In the six years
since the implementation of the Revised ALL, the two articles have
paved the way for strengthening the authority of the courts and
changing the relationship between the courts and the administrative
organs. Hence, having courts review regulatory documents mingles
hope and fear.

VI.

PENDING ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
REGULATORY DOCUMENTS

The Judicial Interpretation of the Revised ALL in 2015, the
Judicial Interpretation of the Revised ALL in 2018, and the first
ONLINE] (Dec. 24, 2013, 10:08 AM),
http://npc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1224/c14576-23930829.html
[http://perma.cc/7VQH-4E9S].
98
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINGZHENG SUSONGFA SHIYI (中华人
民共和国行政诉讼法释义) [Interpretation of the Administrative Litigation Law
of the People’s Republic of China] 139 (Xin Chunying ed., 2014).
99
Another important change in the Revised ALL is to change the expression
of specific administrative actions to administrative actions in Article 12
concerning the scope of judicial review because administrative contracts can be
sued according to the Revised ALL. Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., art. 12.
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typical cases of incidental review of the regulatory documents
published by the Supreme People’s Court all have contributed to the
development of the new mechanism, since the implementation of the
Revised ALL. But there still are many pending issues regarding the
judicial review of regulatory documents.
i. The Judicial Interpretation of the Revised ALL in 2015 and the
First Case of Incidental Review of Regulatory Documents
After the promulgation of the Revised ALL, the Supreme
People’s Court published the Judicial Interpretation to give more
details for those new changes including judicial review of regulatory
documents. The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on
Several Issues of the Implementation of the Administrative Litigation
Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa
Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi] (hereinafter 2015 Judicial Interpretation),
which passed on April 20, 2015 and took effect on May 1, 2015,
stipulated two articles about judicial review of regulatory
documents. 100 It solved some basic questions including when a
plaintiff files a request for review of a regulatory document. 101
According to the 2015 Judicial Interpretation, if a plaintiff
concurrently files a request for review of a regulatory document while
filing a complaint against the administrative action according to
Article 53 of the Revised ALL, the plaintiff shall file the request
before the trial of the first instance; but with a good reason, may file
during the investigative stage of the court session.102 If a regulatory
document is deemed illegal and unfit to determine the legality of the
administrative action, the people’s court shall explain in a statement
of reasons. The people’s court shall provide the authority developing
100

SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (最高
人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》若干问题的解释) [The
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues of the
Implementation of the Administrative Litigation Law of People’s Republic of
China] (Apr. 27, 2015, 11:11), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing14294.html [https://perma.cc/QA2H-ELGT] [hereinafter 2015 Judicial
Interpretation].
101
Id.
102
Id. at art. 20.
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the regulatory document with disposition recommendations and it
may send a copy to the government at the corresponding level of the
authority developing the regulatory document or the next higher
administrative organ.103
After implementation of the Revised ALL, courts at different
levels accepted some cases involving regulatory documents. At the
end of 2015, the first administrative litigation involving legality
review of regulatory documents of ministries under the State Council
was reported by the media.104 The plaintiff, a medicine company,
applied for a trademark from the Trademark Bureau of the former
State Administration for Industry and Commerce. 105 In the same
month, two other companies also applied for a trademark on the same
name. The Trademark Bureau grouped the applications from the
three companies into one day based on a regulatory document
published by the Trademark Bureau. The document stated that one
month should be classified as one day. The plaintiff filed the request
to review the document concurrently while suing the Trademark
Bureau. The court of first instance made the judgment that the
provision of the explanation of “one day” in the document conflicted
with common sense as well as the related provisions in General
Principles of The Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China
[Zhonghua Renmnin Gongheguo Minfa Zongze]106 and violated the

103

Id. at art. 21.
Anhui Huayuan Su Shangbiaoju An Zuo Kaiting(安徽华源诉商标局案昨
开庭)[Anhui Huayua v. Trademark Office Case Was in Session Yesterday),
JIANCHA RIBAO(检察日报)[THE PROCURATORATE DAILY] (Sept. 18, 2015).
105
Anhui Huayuan Yiyao Gongsi, Guojia Gongshang Zongju Shangbiaoju
(安徽华源医药公司,国家工商总局商标局) [Huayuan Medicine Co., Ltd. v.
Trademark Office of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce],
ZHONGGUO XIANZHENGWANG (中国宪政网) [CALAW. CN] (Beijing IP Ct. Dec.
8, 2015), http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=11976
[http://perma.cc/6WMA-LRC2].
106
It was substituted by Original Minfa Zongze (民法总则) [General
Provisions of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
the 5th Session of the 12th Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2017, effective Oct. 1,
2017), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2017-03/15/content_2018907.htm
[http://perma.cc/YW8B-J25K]. Now the General Provisions of Civil Law have
been absorbed in Civil Law Code. See Minfadian (民法典) [Civil Law Code of
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 3th Session of the 13th
Nat’l People’s Cong., May. 28, 2020, effective Jan. 1, 2021),
104
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Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiaofa]. 107 So the court rendered the
judgment to revoke the alleged administrative action in 2015.108 The
scholars discussed the case carefully and believed that judicial review
of regulatory documents can be shaped in individual cases.109 Then
judges and scholars conducted further research on contents under and
intensity of review, recommendation, and other related issues. 110
Later, the court of second instance reviewed the case and rendered
the judgement that the original judgement is clear in fact-finding but
improper in application of laws on July 19, 2018.111 The judgement
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202006/75ba6483b8344591abd07917e1d25cc
8.shtml [https://perma.cc/XJD9-XFMF].
107
Shangbiaofa (商标法) [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the 24th Session of the 5th Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug.
23, 1982, effective Mar. 1, 1982; revised April 23, 2019),
http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2020-12/24/content_5572941.htm
[https://perma.cc/E4MH-YJXW].
108
Anhui Huayuan Yiyao Gongsi, Guojia Gongshang Zongju Shangbiaoju
(安徽华源医药公司,国家工商总局商标局) [Huayuan Medicine Co., Ltd. v.
Trademark Office of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce],
ZHONGGUO XIANZHENGWANG (中国宪政网) [CALAW. CN] (Beijing IP Ct. Dec.
8, 2015), http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=11976
[http://perma.cc/6WMA-LRC2].
109
Xu Xiaodong (徐肖东), Xingzheng Susong Guifanxing Wenjian Fudai
Shencha de Renzhi Jiqi Shixian Jizhi—yi Chen Aihua An yu Huayuan Gongsi An
Weizhu de Fenxi (行政诉讼规范性文件附带审查的认知及其实现机制—以陈
爱华案与华源公司案为主的分析) [Recognition and Realization Mechanism of
Incidental Review of Regulatory Documents in Administrative Litigation: Taking
Chen Aihua Case and Huayuan Gongsi Case as Main Examples], 6 XINGZHENG
FAXUE YANJIU (行政法学研究) [ADMIN. L. REV.] 69, 75–78 (2016).
110
Zhu Mang (朱芒), Guifanxing Wenjian de Hefaxing Yaojian—Shouli
Fudaixing Sifa Shencha Panjueshu Pingxi (规范性文件的合法性要件—首例附
带性司法审查判决书评析) [Elements of Legality of Regulatory Documents:
Analysis of First Incidental Judicial Review Judgment], 11 FAXUE (法学) [LAW
SCI.] 151, 152–160 (2016); Zhang Jiansheng (章剑生), Lun Xingzheng Susong
zhong Guifanxing Wenjian de Hefaxing Shencha (论行政诉讼中规范性文件的
合法性审查) [On Legality Review of Regulatory Documents in Administrative
Litigation], 3 FUJIAN XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO (福建行政学院学报) [J.
FUJIAN ADMIN. INST.] 9, 9–16 (2016).
111
Anhui Huayuan Yiyao Gongsi, Guojia Gongshang Zongju Shangbiaoju
(安徽华源医药公司,国家工商总局商标局) [Huayuan Medicine Co., Ltd. v.
Trademark Office of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce],
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pointed out that according to the second paragraph of Article 74 of
the Revised ALL, an administrative action shall be revoked according
to the law, but if the revocation is anticipated to cause any significant
damage to national or public interest, the legality of the alleged action
may be confirmed as illegal, but the action may not be revoked.112 In
this case, the court adopted the agency’s opinion and believed that
revocation of the alleged administrative action will cause damage to
public interest. 113 Obviously the second instance court was more
cautious in dealing with incidental review of the regulatory document.
As the first case for this new mechanism, it represents the attitude of
the courts that want to take action without pursuing greater changes,
which are inherently disruptive. From a judicial perspective, the
courts may be right to preserve their conservatism. However, any
regulatory document is related to public interest, so it is easy for an
agency to exploit damage to public interest as an excuse. It looks like
the court of second instance solved the dilemma. Judicial review of
regulatory documents may be toothless if few administrative actions
are revoked and if confirmation of legality only means administrative
compensation. Since the courts have to implement the related articles
of incidental review of the regulatory documents—and plaintiffs are
increasingly raising questions about the legality of regulatory
documents—more and more local courts are calling for further
stipulation of the new mechanism which has become one of the
hottest issues in the realm of new legal judicial interpretation.

ZHONGGUO XIANZHENGWANG (中国宪政网) [CALAW. CN] (Beijing IP Ct. Dec.
8, 2015), http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=11976
[http://perma.cc/6WMA-LRC2].
112
Anhui Huayuan Yiyao Gongsi, Guojia Gongshang Zongju Shangbiaoju
(安徽华源医药公司,国家工商总局商标局) [Huayuan Medicine Co., Ltd. v.
Trademark Office of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce],
ZHONGGUO XIANZHENGWANG (中国宪政网) [CALAW. CN] (Beijing IP Ct. Dec.
8, 2015), http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=11976
[http://perma.cc/6WMA-LRC2].
113
Anhui Huayuan Yiyao Gongsi, Guojia Gongshang Zongju Shangbiaoju
(安徽华源医药公司,国家工商总局商标局) [Huayuan Medicine Co., Ltd. v.
Trademark Office of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce],
ZHONGGUO XIANZHENGWANG (中国宪政网) [CALAW. CN] (Beijing IP Ct. Dec.
8, 2015), http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=11976
[http://perma.cc/6WMA-LRC2].
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ii. The Judicial Interpretation of the Revised ALL in 2018
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the
Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s
Republic of China [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi]
(hereinafter 2018 Judicial Interpretation) was adopted on November
3, 2017 and took effect on February 8, 2018; meanwhile the 2015
Judicial Interpretation mentioned above was annulled.114 The 2018
Judicial Interpretation absorbed all the provisions of the 2015 Judicial
Interpretation and improved related provisions concerning judicial
review of regulatory documents. This new Judicial Interpretation
aims to establish a comprehensive system for the review of regulatory
documents with five lengthy provisions covering different kinds of
issues.
First, the 2018 Judicial Interpretation establishes an
independent trial process for regulatory documents with confirmation
of power of the court and right of the agency. Article 147 provides
that a people’s court shall hear the authority developing the document
when it finds that regulatory document may be illegal.115 Hearings
can be conducted in various ways under this context. 116 The
114

SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018, 11:20 AM),
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W] [hereinafter 2018 Judicial Interpretation].
115
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 147,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W] .
116
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 147,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
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Interpretation does not prohibit ex parte contacts. That means the
administrative bodies shall take part in the trial process. It is not the
defendant but rather a participant because this is not a formal
litigation process. Though the Interpretation requires that, if the
authority developing the document requests an agency state its
opinion in court, the people’s court must allow it.117 Thus, the agency
may show up in court or state its opinion through one of a handful of
channels, including submitting a written opinion. This provision
creates enough room for the court to collect opinions from the agency
and for the agency to express its opinions. The provision also
stipulates that an agency that does not state an opinion or provide
related testimony may not stop the court from reviewing regulatory
documents.118
From the provision itself, the trial of regulatory documents
can be an independent phase in administrative litigation.119 However,
there are some unsolved questions, for example, how the court
informs the authority developing the document especially when the
court at the grassroots level accepts a case involving the legality of
regulatory documents published by ministries and commissions
under the State Council. The further question is whether the court
117

SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 147,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
118
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 147,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
119
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 147,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
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has the obligation to collect evidence for regulatory documents if the
agency does not provide any evidence or opinion without good cause.
In normal administrative litigations in China, the defendant bears the
burden of proof. That means if the agency does not provide evidence
for the contested administrative action, it will lose the case. The
outcome in the review of regulatory documents is different from
normal administrative litigations. Even if the agencies do not provide
evidence or opinions, the regulatory document will not be considered
illegal. Thus the agency has no incentive to provide evidence or
opinions. Furthermore, it is impossible for the agencies to provide
opinions or evidence in every case. So it is uncertain that this
provision will be implemented well.
Second, the Judicial Interpretation stipulates clear review
contents and review standards. Article 148 provides that the court
shall review the legality of regulatory documents but not the question
of reasonableness. 120 The contents of review of regulatory
documents include whether the agency oversteps power, violates
statutory procedures, and so on. The provision defines “illegal” in
regulatory documents as follows: (1) Outside the statutory remit of
the developing authority, or beyond the authorization by the law,
regulations, or rules; (2) Contravening the provisions of any law,
regulations, rules, or any other superordinate law; (3) Without a basis
in any law, regulations or rules, illegally increasing any obligation, or
derogating from the lawful rights and interests, of any citizen, legal
person, or any other organization; (4) Failing to comply with the
statutory approval procedure or the public issuance procedure, or
seriously violating the development procedure; (5) Otherwise
violating the law, regulations, or rules.121
120

SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 148,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
121
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 148,
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The provision stipulates the standards for reviewing original
administrative litigation to some extent. Comparatively speaking,
overstepping power or authority in the first standard is easier to judge
and make a conclusion. The second standard about whether the
regulatory document contravenes higher rank laws is not too difficult.
However it is rather difficult to review the procedure requirements.
Due to rough and few procedure requirements of regulatory
documents, we still cannot predict how the court would review the
procedure requirements. In the first case involving regulatory
documents issued by ministry under the State Council in 2015, the
court conducted trials for only the one article deemed controversial
and alleged illegal by the plaintiff, but did not review matter of power
or procedure. The 2018 Judicial Interpretation is obviously different
from the review in the above case. The court shall review every
aspect according to this Interpretation. Combined with Article 147,
Article 148 does not list evidence as the content of legality, which
also implies that the agency does not bear the burden of proof in
judicial review of regulatory documents, although burden of proof is
a common requirement in judicial review of concrete administrative
actions. It still remains to be seen whether it will discourage agencies
from taking judicial review of regulatory documents seriously.
Third, the Interpretation stipulates a multitude of details
concerning disposition recommendations of the courts. Article 149
provides the time, the form, and the outcome of recommendations if
the court deems the reviewed regulatory document illegal. 122 For
example:123
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
122
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 149,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
123
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 149,
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(1) Only if a regulatory document is deemed legal can it be
the basis of administrative action. If the court deems a regulatory
document as illegal, the court shall explain the determination in a
statement of reasons.124
(2) The court shall provide the authority developing the
document with disposition recommendations. Meanwhile it may
send a copy to four kinds of state organs:
a) the government at the corresponding level of the
authority developing the document;
b) the next higher administrative organ;
c) the supervision organ(s);
d) the recording and review authority of regulatory
documents.125
The scope of state organs to which recommendations should
be sent in the 2018 Judicial Interpretation is broader than that in the
2015 Judicial Interpretation. The supervision organs here mainly
refer to the supervision commissions which are also emphasized in
the organ reform and revision of the Constitution in 2018, which play
a role in the whole state structure and are intended to supervise
regulatory documents more efficiently.
Copying the
recommendation to the supervision organs provides more clues to the
supervision organs. The recording and review authority will also
receive a copy of the recommendation, which signals cooperation
between the recording and review system and the judicial review
system.
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
124
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 149,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
125
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 149,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
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(3) The court shall raise suggestions to revise or annul
regulatory documents to the authority developing the regulatory
documents within three months of the effectiveness of the judgment.
If the regulatory documents are stipulated by several departments, the
court may send recommendations to the sponsoring authority or
to their common administrative organ at the next higher level. This
provision aims to solve the dispute over the definition of
responsibility of respective governments when documents are
stipulated by several departments.126
(4) The administrative organs who get recommendations shall
respond in written form within 60 days. If the situation is urgent, the
court may suggest the authority developing the document or the next
higher government stop execution immediately. This provision is
very important for the implementation of recommendations.
Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether the government shall be
treated as “contempt of court” as in normal administrative litigation
if they refuse to implement the recommendation.127
Forth, it stipulates the supervision procedure in the court
system in Article 150 and Article 151.128

126

SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 149,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
127
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 149,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
128
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 150,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
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(1) The judgment shall be recorded to the next higher court if
a regulatory document is deemed as illegal. When the document is
stipulated by ministries under the State Council or by provincial
governments, judicial recommendations shall also be submitted to the
Supreme People’s Court or the Higher People’s Court to record and
review. In order to prevent destroying uniformity of the legal system,
lower level courts should report to higher level courts during the
review process. This provision does not specify what higher level
courts should do after receiving recommendations. One possible
action is to collect information and publish a related judgment or
recommendation to all courts. Another possible action is to inform
the relevant government that has the authority over the document in
question.129
(2) If the president of a people’s court at any level discovers
that an effective judgment or ruling of the court makes a wrong
determination of legality of regulatory documents and deems a retrial
necessary, the president shall submit the case to the judicial
committee of the court for discussion. The provision aims to solve
the problem of how to find and correct wrong judgment of regulatory
documents. The person who holds the authority to raise the issue is
the president, and the body that maintains the authority to retry the
case is the judicial committee of the court. So the retrial process is
also incorporated in the judicial review of regulatory documents.130
(3) If the Supreme People’s Court, or people’s court at any
level, discovers that any effective judgment or ruling of the court
makes a wrong determination of legality of regulatory documents,
129

SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 150,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
130
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 151,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
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they reserve the power to directly retry the case or specify the
people’s court at a lower level to retry the case. The provision
stipulates additional content for the trial supervision procedure which
keeps pace with the whole supervision procedure in administrative
litigation.131
iii. The First Batch of Typical Cases of Incidental Review of the
Regulatory Document
Since the 2018 Judicial Interpretation took effect in February,
more and more local courts began to implement this Interpretation to
review regulatory documents. In May 2018, the Supreme People’s
Court promptly drafted the individual Judicial Interpretation for
judicial review of regulatory documents which was ranked in the
project’s initial plan of the judicial interpretation by the Supreme
People’s Court in 2018. 132 The reason why the Supreme People’s
Court did so was that lower courts remained confused about the
judicial review of regulatory documents. The Supreme People’s
Court wanted to provide confidence, support, and techniques to push
forward judicial review of regulatory documents, though it is not easy
to reach consensus on consequential issues. On October 30, 2018,
the Supreme People’s Court published nine typical administrative
litigation cases with incidental review of the regulatory documents.133
131

SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 151,
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPMQY7W].
132
Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 2018 Niandu Sifa
Jieshi Lixiang Jihua (最高人民法院 2018 年度司法解释立项计划) [The Project
Initial Plan of the Judicial Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court in 2018],
CHINA COURT.ORG (July 17, 2018, 10:34 PM),
http://www.sohu.com/a/241822337_164794 [http://perma.cc/3V8Z-EHE5].
133
Supreme People’s Court, Xingzheng Susong Fudai Shencha Guifanxing
Wenjian Dianxing Anli (行政诉讼附带审查规范性文件典型案例) [Typical
Administrative Litigation Cases with Incidental Review of Regulatory
Documents], CHINA COURT.ORG (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:19 AM),
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-125871.html [http://perma.cc/GP243R28].
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The Administrative Tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court
introduced that all these typical cases were the first batch of cases
since the implementation of the Revised ALL. Courts across the
country already reviewed 3,880 cases incidentally in the first instance
from January 2016 to October 2018. 134 These cases are typically
about medical insurance, public security, price administration, drug
administration, land approval, environment supervision, enforcement,
and administrative compensation. It looks like the Supreme People’s
Court aims to state their opinions about the incidental review of the
regulatory documents among nine typical cases.
(1) In three cases, the courts finally stated that the regulatory
documents were illegal; while four regulatory documents were legal.
Regardless of whether the regulatory documents were legal or illegal,
the courts conducted formal review in seven cases according to the
enactments of Judicial Interpretation published in the Spring of 2018,
applying the review standards including whether the drafting body,
drafting goal, and drafting procedure comply with legal enactments
and whether there is any obvious illegal provision in the regulatory
documents.135
(2) In the eighth case, the court declared that due to procedural
reasons the administrative action under litigation should fall within
the scope of administrative litigation and the regulatory documents
should not be reviewed incidentally.136 In the last case, the court
134

Supreme People’s Court, Xingzheng Susong Fudai Shencha Guifanxing
Wenjian Dianxing Anli Xinwen Fabuhui (行政诉讼附带审查规范性文件典型案
例新闻发布会) [News Release Conference on Typical Administrative Litigation
Cases with Incidental Review of Regulatory Documents], CHINA COURT.ORG
(Oct. 30, 2018, 11:10 AM), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing125531.html [http://perma.cc/3KYK-VCFR].
135
Supreme People’s Court, Xingzheng Susong Fudai Shencha Guifanxing
Wenjian Dianxing Anli (行政诉讼附带审查规范性文件典型案例) [Typical
Administrative Litigation Cases with Incidental Review of Regulatory
Documents], CHINA COURT.ORG (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:19 AM),
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-125871.html [http://perma.cc/GP243R28].
136
Supreme People’s Court, Mao Aimei & Zhu Hongxing Su Zhejiangsheng
Jiangshanshi Hecunzhen Renmin Zhengfu Xingzheng Qiangzhi ji Xingzheng
Peichang An (毛爱梅、祝洪兴诉浙江省江山市贺村镇人民政府行政强制及行
政赔偿案) [Administrative Enforcement and Administrative Compensation Case
of Mao Aimei & Zhu Hongxing v. Hecun County Government of Jiangshan City
in Zhejiang Province], CHINA COURT.ORG (OCT. 30, 2018, 11:28 AM),
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pointed out that the regulatory documents the plaintiff requested to
review were not the legal basis for administrative action under
litigation, which means judicial review is only incidental review for
the related provisions or the provisions that form a legal basis, rather
than all provisions.137
(3) The intention of the Supreme People’s Court is to reaffirm
that the courts have the authority to review the regulatory documents
and the details of this new mechanism are becoming clearer. For
example, in the fifth case, the court believed that the typical case was
helpful to acknowledge the legal rights of the female and protect them
better. However, the Supreme People’s Court did not provide further
conclusions about how the mechanism of incidental review of
regulatory documents should perform.138
The number of incidental review cases of administrative
regulatory documents increased after the revised ALL became
effective in 2017, reaching a peak in 2019 then subsequently
decreasing in 2020.139 No matter how scholars, the National People’s

https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/10/id/3551948.shtml
[http://perma.cc/XVM7-UJHR].
137
Supreme People’s Court, Chengdu Jinpai Tianshi Yiliao Keji Youxian
Zeren Gongsi Su Sichuansheng Chengdushi Kexue Jishuju Keji Xiangmu Zizhu
Xingzheng Xuke An (成都金牌天使医疗科技有限责任公司诉四川省成都市科
学技术局科技项目资助行政许可案) [Administrative Licence Case of Chengdu
Gold Metal Angel Medical Technology Co., Ltd v. Chengdu Science and
Technology Bureau in Sichuan Province], CHINA COURT.ORG (Oct. 30, 2018,
11:25 AM), https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/10/id/3551944.shtml
[http://perma.cc/TST9-9NDM].
138
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Renmin Zhengfu Tudi Xingzheng Pizhun An (郑晓琴诉浙江省温岭市人民政府
土地行政批准案) [Land Approval Case of Zheng Xiaoqin v. Wenling City
Government in Zhejiang Province], CHINA COURT.ORG (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:25
AM), https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/10/id/3551934.shtml
[http://perma.cc/4NRK-U7QG].
139
According to the statistics provided by the website of the Supreme Court,
there were 15,457 cases in 2020, 20,970 cases in 2019, and 18,721 cases in 2018,
which may be related to regulatory documents. Concerning formal judgments,
there were 10,414 cases in 2020, 14,761 cases in 2019, and 12,968 cases in 2018.
Following the News Release Conference on Typical Administrative Litigation
Cases with Incidental Review of Regulatory Documents in 2018, the Supreme
Court did not published any report or statistics about incidental review of
administrative regulatory documents, so the number of cases is unknown. See
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Congress, and the Supreme People’s Court design the system of
judicial review of regulatory documents, key problems will persist in
the short term given that the practice of judicial review has not
fundamentally changed and the government remains more powerful
than the courts. Yet the environment is slowly changing. Lower level
courts are showing greater courage and incentive to review regulatory
documents published by higher level governments. The governments
also are making efforts to improve regulatory documents and push
forward the rule of law in government. Regardless of what comes
next, the gate of judicial review of regulatory documents has been
opened, and the momentum will continue forward rather than
reviving the past. Questions and problems will continue to emerge
and deserve thorough discussion along the way.
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